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Abstract 
This paper considers the continuation of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on the United States of America. Situating psychiatric 
diagnosis and hospitalization within the broader context of decades of social and historical 
research, as well as emergent fields such as feminist philosophy of disability, critical 
diversity studies (CDS), and mad studies, I argue that a socially mediated process which is 
legitimated with appeals to “health” and “safety” should not be maintained during a 
pandemic of a readily communicable virus that is especially dangerous for individuals 
clustered in inpatient settings. A CDS approach allows the clear identification of “severe 
mental illness” as a marked category of social difference which leads to multiple forms of 
social oppression. In this paper, I show how involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is a social 
process through which marked individuals are dehumanized and confined. Furthermore, I 
consider why the maintenance of the status quo, even under pandemic conditions, 
demonstrates that involuntary treatment is primarily a political, rather than a medical, 
process. Finally, I outline why the politics of involuntary treatment should concern 
longstanding disciplines such as public health and bioethics, as well as emergent disciplines 
like CDS. 
Introduction 
COVID-19 is itself a new phenomenon, but its emergence as a global pandemic has 
starkly revealed many structures and processes of inequality and social oppression that are 
not at all new. Some of these underlying disparities have received ample attention, others 
much less so. Regardless, the energy that government entities, social advocates and political 
pundits, medical establishments, and even academic disciplines put into sustaining expected 
divisions and procedures in these inappropriate circumstances can reveal clear information 
about the systems, structures, and assumptions that shape and maintain the status quo in 
society. This paper considers the continuation of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization 
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during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on the United States. I argue that a socially 
mediated process legitimated with appeals to notions of “health” and “safety” should not 
continue during a pandemic of a readily communicable that is especially dangerous for 
individuals who are clustered in congregate inpatient settings. I point out, furthermore, that 
the continuation of this process reveals the workings of power and oppression that underlie 
the use of “mental health” as a marker of social difference. 
Situating psychiatric diagnosis and hospitalization within the broader context of 
decades of social and historical research, as well as emergent fields such as feminist 
philosophy of disability, critical diversity studies (CDS), and mad studies, I examine the ways 
in which medicalized concepts of danger and risk are deployed or ignored in ways that 
perpetuate processes through which individuals in psychiatric settings continue to be silenced 
and restricted, both physically and socially. Arguments that systematically prioritize 
hypothetical psychiatric risk over the proven risks of viral transmission permeate public 
health, policy, and bioethics, as well as medicine. The maintenance of the status quo, even 
under pandemic conditions, demonstrates that involuntary treatment is primarily a political, 
rather than a medical, process. I discuss how involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is a 
social process through which marked individuals are dehumanized and confined and how the 
shape of this process mirrors other systems of marginalization and oppression. Finally, I 
outline why this particular process of dehumanization and confinement should be a pressing 
concern for longstanding disciplines such as public health and bioethics, in addition to the 
interest that this process garners in emergent disciplines like CDS. 
Madness as Otherness, Still and Again 
Many social theorists have used madness and psychiatry as paradigmatic case studies of 
social regulation of difference and thus the emerging tools of inquiry have become common 
in studies of power, disadvantage, and threats to diversity. Many of Michel Foucault’s 
formative concepts were developed around an examination of madness, psychiatric power, 
and abnormality as social constructs (e.g., Foucault, 1961/1988, 2003). This thread of 
inquiry, as described by historian Roy Porter (2002), suggests new directions for 
understanding madness and its implications: “The history of madness properly written would 
thus be an account not of disease and its treatment but of questions of freedom and control, 
knowledge and power” (p. 3). The insights gained in part from this history have been applied 
widely to other world structures and processes by social scientists, philosophers, and 
humanities scholars, with a focus on understanding the common mechanisms by which 
phenomena and people are marked and become objects of excess social and governmental 
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intervention, surveillance, and control. As Shelley Tremain puts it, “Foucault’s studies of 
abnormality, madness, and deviance … were designed to show how these phenomena became 
thinkable, that is, emerged as problems to which solutions came to be sought” (Tremain, 
2017, p. 5). 
International social movements in the mid-twentieth century focused on the practical 
dimensions of the daily lives of psychiatric inmates, showing that these dimensions of their 
lives were suffused with violence, oppression, and dehumanization. The insights of these 
movements were a foundational part of trends towards psychiatric deinstitutionalization and 
movements of anti-psychiatry. For example, Franco Basaglia, who was instrumental in the 
“democratic psychiatry” movement in Italy, defined the concept of mental illness as a “socio-
political problem” rather than as an example of individualized disease, identifying parallels 
between psychiatric institutionalization and the overarching tendency towards 
institutionalized violence and exclusion in society: 
The main characteristic of these institutions is the clear division between those 
with power and those without it. The division of roles involves a relationship 
of abuse and violence between the powerful and powerless, which turns into 
the exclusion of the powerless from power. Violence and exclusion underlie 
social relations in our society … 
This is the recent history of a society organized on the clear division between 
the haves and the have nots, which leads to deceptive dichotomies between the 
good and the bad, the healthy and the sick, and the respectable and the 
disreputable. The situation is quite transparent – paternal authority is 
oppressive and arbitrary; schools are based on threats and blackmail; the 
employer exploits the worker; asylums destroy mental patients. (Basaglia et 
al., 1968/1987, pp. 60–61) 
To take another example, Thomas Szasz (1973), a leader within the anti-psychiatry 
movement of that period, similarly described psychiatric power as one of social control: 
According to the view I have endeavoured to develop and clarify, however, 
there is, and can be, no such thing as mental illness or psychiatric treatment; 
the interventions now designated as "psychiatric treatment" must be clearly 
identified as voluntary or involuntary: voluntary interventions are things a 
person does for himself in an effort to change, whereas involuntary 
interventions are things done to him in an effort to change him against his will; 
and psychiatry is not a medical but a moral and political enterprise. (p. 306) 
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It is notable that even though the words of so many prominent social theorists, over so many 
years, have been dedicated to the entanglement of madness and otherness, medicalization of 
psychiatric difference and marginalization on its basis are still widely accepted and broadly 
ignored across the globe, including in the United States. 
Numerous academic disciplines and subdisciplines, which themselves tend to merge 
at margins and intersections of traditional and recent academic categories, could productively 
take on questions of madness as difference in parallel to other systems of differentiation and 
marginalization. Feminist disability studies, which defines disability and femaleness in social 
terms, rather than as natural forms of deficiency, flaw, lack, or excess (Garland-Thomson, 
2005), is one promising arena for such critical theoretical interventions. Both mad studies 
(and the “mad pride” movement from which it derives) and critical disability studies, which 
are concerned with resisting individualizing and medicalizing approaches by focusing on 
social restriction and oppression, are other promising arenas of critical intervention (Lewis, 
2006). Furthermore, feminist bioethics, which could call for the adoption of a social justice 
approach to the restoration of rights and dignity that have been denied through psychiatric 
disablement, is another potential theoretical ally (Thachuk, 2011). Finally, feminist 
philosophy of disability, a new subfield of philosophy that Tremain introduced, which 
remains in critical dialogue with these fields, sharing some of their theoretical and political 
assumptions while retaining a distinct identity from them, is yet another promising line of 
inquiry for the expansion of critical analyses about madness as difference. Tremain’s work in 
feminist philosophy of disability is especially distinct insofar as she defines disability as an 
“apparatus,” that is, as a “far-reaching and systemic matrix of power that contributes to, is 
inseparable from, and reinforces other apparatuses of historical force relations” (Tremain, 
2017, p. 22). At the intersections of Tremain’s work, in particular, and feminist philosophy of 
disability, more generally, as well as these other related strands of inquiry, emerge productive 
conversations about how psychiatric categories can be analyzed through the lenses of 
feminist philosophy and disability studies (e.g. Bergstresser, 2011; Wolframe, 2012; Mollow, 
2014). 
Initially drawn from Foucault, the concept of biopolitics now refers to multiple 
strands of interrelated inquiry within the social sciences and humanities, which identify the 
centrality of the normal and normalization to general principles of exclusion. Within this 
frame of analysis, disability can be recognized as central to the operation of biopower 
(Tremain, 2017; Mills, 2018). Intersections of social science, ethics, and public health 
approaches have contributed empirical works that interweave the study of disability, 
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marginalization, psychiatry, and stigma in everyday life (e.g. Wiener, 2014; Kleinman, 1999; 
Bergstresser et al., 2013; Brodwin, 2013; Sabatello et al., 2020). In addition, emergent fields 
that specifically address psychiatric categories and the concept of developmental disability 
include mad studies and neurodiversity studies, and both fields of inquiry focus on societal 
marginalization, emphasizing the inclusion of lived experience and community self-advocacy 
in academic and policy processes (Price, 2011; Jones & Brown, 2012; McWade et al., 2015). 
A CDS approach allows the clear identification of “severe mental illness” as a marked 
category of social difference which leads to multiple forms of social oppression (Thomas, 
2014) and can support the analysis of disability as an apparatus of power relations (Tremain, 
2018). While there is a great deal of overlap between CDS and the other academic disciplines 
discussed above, there nevertheless remains substantial fragmentation and division in 
academia that impedes both fully multidisciplinary work and social and academic solidarity. 
“Colonialised, gendered, raced, classed, ablest, heterosexed and other such unequal relations 
need to be deconstructed and built upon new foundations” (Steyn, 2018, p. 8). This rebuilding 
should include an examination of the enduring parallels between othering and 
dehumanization of the “mad” and dehumanization of other groups of people who have been 
systemically stigmatized, marginalized, and subjected to eugenic policies. Historically, 
groups of people identified as “problems” have often been painted with the same brush. 
Distinct forms of marginalization and stigmatization too can be identified, such as rhetorics 
of “primitivism” and inadequate moral, intellectual, and rational development, which have 
been a major source of imagery to describe mental illness, informing both popular and 
professional discourse (Lucas & Barrett, 1995). Furthermore, psychiatric marginalization and 
disadvantage accrue with other categories of difference, creating intersectional situations of 
repression (Bergstresser, 2011; Frieh, 2020). For example, in the United States, African 
American men are disproportionately subject to involuntary psychiatric hospitalization 
(Merritt-Davis and Keshavan, 2006; Davis et al., 2010), shuffled between psychiatric 
hospitals, homeless shelters, and prisons in the “institutional circuit” (Hopper et al., 1997). 
The COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately sickened and killed many of these men, as 
well as members of other marginalized groups in the United States who at present are 
confined and institutionalized in prisons and psychiatric hospitals. 
COVID-19 in Psychiatric Hospitals and Other Forgotten Institutions in the USA 
The arrival of COVID-19 has had a catastrophic impact in the United States, with over 9 
million cases and over 230,000 deaths as of November 1, 2020 (New York Times, 2020).1 As 
in other social and political domains, more moral weight has been placed on the illness and 
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experiences of some people than on the experiences of other people whose situations 
continue to be ignored. Over the spring and summer months of 2020, as it became apparent 
that congregate residential institutions were particularly risky settings for the spread of the 
virus, special tracking categories were designated by the New York Times to track cases in 
institutions, including jails and prisons, nursing homes, and colleges. An additional category, 
labeled “Other significant clusters,” also exists among the New York Times’s classifications 
to identify “some of the country’s less-noticed coronavirus clusters.” This category includes a 
wide range of facilities, including military installations, industrial manufacturing plants, 
religious institutions, psychiatric hospitals, residential institutions for individuals with 
developmental disabilities (generally called “developmental centers” and “intermediate care 
facilities”), homeless shelters, institutions for “troubled” adolescents (“adolescent treatment 
centers” and “alternative schools”), and treatment centers for substance abuse; most of these 
facilities include areas with locked residential components, and many of them treat 
individuals committed involuntarily (either “forensic” or “civil” commitments), individuals 
under other types of court order, or individuals under conditions of severe scarcity and 
duress. In short, there is clear evidence that people who reside in congregate settings of this 
sort are at greater risk from COVID-19 (Landes et al., 2020). Of the top 131 centers listed as 
“Other significant clusters,” 44 of them are designed to contain individuals deemed 
developmentally disabled, psychiatrically ill, troubled adolescents, abusers of substances, and 
the unhoused, and 13 locations are specifically psychiatric hospitals or residential centers, 
with case numbers ranging from 279 at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital in New Jersey to 55 at 
Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (New York Times, 2020). 
As COVID-19 began to spread within the United States in spring of 2020, some 
Northeastern states were the hardest hit initially. New York and New Jersey, in particular, 
had very high case counts in April and May. By April, substantial frustration was expressed 
by psychiatric hospital staff in these states, with one New York hospital worker saying: “they 
treat us the same way they treat the mentally ill. They want to forget us” (Hakim, 2020). New 
Jersey, in addition, also had notably high counts in particular types of institutional settings, 
with the country’s highest case count at any psychiatric hospital (279 cases) and nursing 
home (375 cases), as well as the second highest national count at a developmental center (324 
cases) (New York Times, 2020).2 Around 2,500 prisoners were released from Rikers Island, 
New York by mid-June (Rodriguez, 2020) and New Jersey released 1,200 prisoners by 
October through a state executive order, with plans to release 3,000 more by the end of the 
year (Vogt, 2020). So, it would be reasonable to have expected that a similar public and 
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public-health system outcry would be mobilized to encourage decarceration and limits on 
new involuntary treatment orders in psychiatric hospital settings, settings that are also high-
risk locations where residents often cannot leave by choice. However, no such outcry 
occurred. To the contrary, though the situation in these institutions was severe, individuals 
were not released from hospitals nor were the criteria for involuntary commitment made 
more stringent; rather, protections and procedures were cut back, and some of the traditional 
checks on the system were removed, making involuntary commitment easier to implement 
and relaxing or eliminating the typical requirement for timely discharge planning. 
On March 25, 2020, New York State issued a statement that documentation 
regulations would be relaxed in psychiatric hospitals, that the procedure for initiating 
involuntary treatments could newly be initiated and virtually signed by an off-site 
psychiatrist: “For [civil commitment] involuntary paperwork, an off-site psychiatrist can print 
and complete paperwork and then send electronically to an on-site clinician to be placed in 
the patient's record” (Smith, 2020a). Possible treatment options were limited: “Programs 
should cancel all therapeutic, rehabilitative, and recreational groups that do not align with 
physical distancing and other mitigation recommendations.” In addition, the statement 
decreed that discharge planning could be delayed as long as “attempts” at timeliness were 
made, that discharge plans “for identified high-risk patients” could be delayed indefinitely.3 
Multiple regulations ensuring patient rights and safety have also been waived or 
relaxed in psychiatric hospitals, including in New York which waived the typical requirement 
that a physician must examine a patient before ordering “seclusion and restraint,” allowing a 
licensed nurse practitioner or physician assistant to do so instead. As infections decreased in 
New York State in June, the emergency declarations were not reversed; rather, they were put 
into effect “indefinitely” (Smith, 2020b). The US Centers for Disease Control also waived 
national requirements under the rubric of patient rights for hospitals in states impacted by a 
widespread COVID-19 outbreak, including the requirement to provide medical records in a 
timely manner and requirements outlining visitation rights and limiting seclusion. 
The rationale for involuntary admission to, or retention in, an inpatient psychiatric 
unit in the US varies by state and involuntary commitment can be either forensic or civil; in 
either case, however, a person must be declared mentally ill. Forensic commitments are 
directly connected to the criminal-justice system. Civil commitments go through civil courts 
and typically require a professional determination that, without immediate treatment, the 
person is at risk of significant self-harm, or is a danger to others, or is “gravely disabled” 
(Dailey et al., 2020). In some states, including New Jersey, a risk of danger to property is also 
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included as a possible criterion. Though the exact term is not always used, the concept of 
“gravely disabled” requires a determination that, due to mental illness, an individual is unable 
to provide for their own basic needs, with risk of psychiatric deterioration sometimes 
included as part of this definition. For example, in Connecticut: 
“Gravely disabled” refers to a person who, due to mental or emotional 
impairment, is in danger of serious harm because he has failed or is unable to 
provide for his basic needs such as essential food, clothing, shelter, or safety. 
The person needs hospital treatment, which is available, but his psychiatric 
disabilities make him incapable of determining whether to accept it. (Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann., 2006, § 17a-495(a)) 
New York State does not use the “grave disablement” category, but instead defines a similar 
category of "in need of involuntary care and treatment" to mean that “a person has a mental 
illness for which care and treatment as a patient in a hospital is essential to such person's 
welfare and whose judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand the need for such 
care and treatment” (NY Ment Hygiene L, 2015, § 9.03). 
Ethical practice should include that the risks described above be balanced against the 
risk of contracting COVID-19 in a facility. Consideration should also be given to the ways in 
which viral infection introduces substantial excess risk in psychiatric populations, who are 
often taking psychotropic medications that may have dangerous adverse reactions with 
medications used to treat the virus (Luykx et al., 2020). Antipsychotic medications are also 
linked to the development of obesity and diabetes (American Diabetes Association, 2004), 
and psychiatric populations are disproportionately affected by relevant comorbidities such as 
diabetes, which likely augment the risk of severe forms of infection and death from COVID- 
19 (Mantovani et al., 2020). 
Pandemic-related seclusion and isolation from personal contact also 
disproportionately impact individuals who are institutionalized and thus likely to be 
marginalized. New Jersey, by November 2020, reported that statewide 223 of 1,157 state 
hospital patients and 545 staff tested positive, with 13 patient deaths and 8 staff deaths (New 
Jersey, 2020). Nevertheless, the state focused its regulation changes primarily on the 
introduction of telehealth and reduction of virus transmission through sanitary measures. A 
number of these measures serve to put individuals who are already heavily surveilled and 
marginalized into an even more isolated situation. For example, in May 2020, Trenton State 
Hospital stopped visits, dining in the cafeteria, and group programming (Wramage-Caporoso, 
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2020). It is therefore questionable to what degree in-person social contact has been available 
to inpatients of New York and New Jersey psychiatric institutions during the pandemic. 
Danger to Whom? Risk to What? 
In the case of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization during the COVID-19 pandemic in the 
United States, the concepts of health and risk have been used to maintain the status quo rather 
than to protect psychiatrically disabled individuals from viral illness. Furthermore, this 
maintenance process has relied on strategic use of the concepts of health, illness, public 
safety, and health care to justify keeping individuals in congregate situations where risk of 
contagion is demonstrably high. Nevertheless, the hypocrisy inherent in this formulation is 
ignored, or perhaps never perceived at all. Examples can be found both in medical literature 
and in government public health regulations. 
Multiple letters have been written to medical journals by ethics-conscious 
psychiatrists debating the conditions that necessitate involuntary psychiatric hospitalization 
of individuals who test positive for COVID-19 and are deemed unable to follow sanitary 
regulations, either because of their mental illness or for unrelated reasons (Gold et al., 2020; 
Parker et al., 2020; Sorrentino et al., 2020; Ghossoub & Newman, 2020). This situation is 
considered to be a potential “danger” to others, where these others include health-facility staff 
and individuals in the general community. While it is heartening that these psychiatrists wrote 
the letters to implore other psychiatrists not to abuse commitment laws by hospitalizing 
potential patients deemed mentally ill due to viral infection and regardless of current severity 
of their psychiatric symptoms, it is less heartening that psychiatrists felt compelled to write 
the letters because they had already witnessed this type of inappropriate use of commitment 
law during the pandemic. 
A notable exception is a column written by psychiatrist Brian Barnett (2020), who 
admits explicit concern for inpatients in a pandemic. He states: “I am concerned for my 
inpatients. There is no guarantee we can keep them safe from this insidious threat, and many 
of them are at high risk for serious COVID-19 complications” (p. 979). It is also notable that 
this letter appears in the “Personal Accounts” section of Psychiatric Service, a trade journal 
that is co-edited by Pat Deegan, Ph.D., a prominent researcher who works on advocacy for 
recovery empowerment for mental health services users and was herself diagnosed with 
schizophrenia as a teenager (Deegan, 2020). The contributions of individuals with lived 
experience of the mental-health system process allows a wider range of viewpoints to be 
heard in general. 
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Bioethics commentaries have been written that express concern for the serious risk of 
infection within psychiatric hospitals, but they do not typically go on to argue for 
decarceration of uninfected residents, not even of residents who are still present in the system 
merely because their discharge process has been delayed. Instead, these commentaries, after 
mentioning the preferability of voluntary hospitalization because of its higher effectiveness, 
eventually draw conclusions according to which most involuntary hospitalization should 
proceed as normal. For example: “However, should shared decision-making fail, more 
assertive interventions may be needed. These include judicial review and action, where a 
judge is petitioned to order the treatment of a patient over their objection” (Russ et al., 2020, 
p. 579). Alongside discussions of risks to inpatients due to COVID-19, there are descriptions 
of risks to the perpetuation of the system that might occur if patients catch the virus: 
“Contracting Covid-19 during an involuntary psychiatric hospitalization could reinforce 
patients’ paranoia and distrust of the health care system, creating yet another future barrier to 
adequate medical and psychiatric treatment” (Conrad et al., 2020). It is notable that patient 
mistrust here is cataloged with “paranoia,” even though the psychiatric health care system 
clearly continues to mismanage the COVID-19 outbreak. Some bioethicists have in addition 
pushed for a return to the “asylum” model of psychiatric care (Sisti et al., 2015), essentially 
supporting medicalization processes.4 
It is instructive to compare discussions of decarceration from jails and prisons due to 
COVID-19 with discussions around involuntary psychiatric confinement and COVID-19. For 
example, arguments for the former include that “Properly managed, correctional depopulation 
will prevent considerable COVID-19 morbidity and mortality and reduce prevailing 
socioeconomic and health inequities” (Franco-Paredes et al., 2020, p. 1) and, in addition, that 
the unjust and dire situation in US correctional facilities “necessitates rapid decarceration 
measures that effectively balance public safety and public health” (Abraham et al., 2020, p. 
780). The potential dangers of releasing prisoners are described, in general, as outweighed by 
the injustice of mass incarceration in the United States, which disproportionately impacts 
already marginalized groups. 
In April 2020, Public Defender Service filed an emergency motion in the District of 
Columbia Superior Court to release prisoners and “some mentally ill people from District 
facilities and detainees at the city’s only halfway house for men because of the coronavirus” 
(Moyer, 2020). This motion applied only to individuals charged with misdemeanors who 
were undergoing competency proceedings, with no mention of civilly committed individuals 
who had not been charged with any crime. A Federal judge later intervened, but only to force 
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city officials to change procedures at St Elizabeth’s psychiatric hospital to “individually 
quarantine patients exposed to the coronavirus, to limit employees from moving between 
units each workday, and to conduct regular system-wide testing even for those without 
symptoms” (Peak, 2020). 
In their argument that health care professionals should “lead the charge” for prison-
system decarceration, Sivashanker and colleagues (2020) mention that people with mental 
illness are disproportionately imprisoned, but rather than draw parallel calls for decarceration 
from psychiatric hospitals, they blame “psychiatric deinstitutionalisation” for this situation. 
For the United States, this charge amounts to a well-worn trope that serves to absolve the 
government from responsibility for closing hospitals without providing any sort of 
compensatory medical, financial, housing, educational, or financial support. A relevant 
comparison can be made to Italy, which did create a national system of post-
deinstitutionalization community mental health care and general health care, as well as 
offering many other general forms of social support that the United States lacks (Amaddeo et 
al., 2012). With neither large long-term psychiatric hospitals nor involuntary commitment for 
reasons of hypothetical danger to self or others, Italy’s violent crime rates are comparatively 
low. For example, the 2018 intentional homicide rate (per 100,000) in the United States is 
5.0, while in Italy it is 0.6 (UNODC, 2020). The prison population rate per 100,000 for 2018 
in the United States was 647.5, while in Italy it was 100.8 (UNODC, 2020). Italy’s suicide 
rate is less than half that of the United States (OECD, 2019). 
The concepts of danger, risk, and public safety are inextricably intertwined with the 
status quo of psychiatric systems. In many cases, these concepts are so embedded in these 
systems as to be taken for granted as necessary components of health and personal safety. As 
a result, the underlying patterns of systemic marginalization and exclusion to which they 
contribute can become invisible. Robert Castel (1991) explains that systems have shifted 
towards a calculation of risk at population levels, with a new focus on “the probabilistic and 
abstract existence of risks. One does not start from a conflictual situation observable in 
experience, rather one deduces it from a general definition of the dangers one wishes to 
prevent” (Castel, 1991, pp. 287–288). Nevertheless, while the word “danger” has sometimes 
been recast as “risk” in lists of criteria for involuntary civil commitment, dangerousness is 
still a prominent feature of the broad conception of the dangers that one wishes to prevent, 
leaving the psychiatric system suffused with both risk prediction and the underlying fear of 
danger from madness. 
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Many psychiatrists supported the advent of the “grave disablement” criterion and 
similar criteria for involuntary treatment as a means with which to combat the stigma that 
“dangerousness” labels impart to the process; however, the concept of “dangerous” is also 
quite problematic. Determinations of risk in these cases are not only based on a need for 
support in daily life, but rather on the assumption that, due to a person’s diagnosis of 
psychiatric disability, they are unable to “rationally” determine their own needs. Often this 
assumption is expressed as “lack of insight” into one’s own illness. As Margaret Price (2011) 
notes, however, along with the ideas of “objectivity” and “scientific,” the rhetoric of 
rationality itself has been and can be an oppressive construct meant to designate groups of 
individuals who should be excluded from decision-making of all sorts. This rhetorical gesture 
reinforces the notion that mental disability, and by extension disability in general, is 
inherently connected to a lack of autonomous capacity. In the United States and elsewhere, 
the notion of autonomy rests at the center of academic bioethics (Tremain, 2017), with the 
discipline at large tending to discard any curiosity about the lives of certain people once a 
determination of “limited capacity” or lack of “rationality” is proclaimed. Once a person’s 
autonomy can be discounted, all that remains, according to the bioethicist, is beneficence, 
which in the case of involuntary psychiatric confinement tends towards the default of paternal 
decision-making for another’s own good. Moving beyond the disciplinary focus on individual 
autonomy and away from the dichotomization of autonomy and beneficence could allow 
bioethics scholars to rediscover hidden yet systematic processes of dehumanization that 
underlie psychiatric disablement. 
Conclusion: Remembering and Refusing to Forget 
As academic disciplines continue to struggle with systemic inequalities and the meanings of 
difference, it is important to acknowledge that populations which are isolated, marginalized, 
and silenced can be easily forgotten and ignored. Remembering is worth the effort. One 
might think, after all of the academic and social revelations that have occurred in the United 
States since the mid-twentieth century, that Americans would reflexively consider the 
socially oppressive aspect of involuntary hospitalization in psychiatry. In the United States, 
however, involuntary commitment continues to be classified as a medical problem, a legal 
problem, and a problem of danger and risk, rather than a question of human rights. Careful 
observation of the narratives that surround institutionalization show that it remains a 
biopolitical process focused on rhetoric of rationality and the management of risk. 
Human beings in the United States continue to be institutionalized in psychiatric 
hospitals and denied control over their own lives, including denial of their right to avoid 
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congregate situations where the transmission of COVID-19 is common. These people have 
been forgotten. Although concern for people involuntarily institutionalized and other 
invisible populations should be of interest to emergent disciplines like CDS and disability 
studies, the circumstances of these populations should also be a pressing concern for 
longstanding disciplines such as public health and bioethics; at present, they are not. 
Although there is a promising trend in academic bioethics to attend to questions of 
social justice, such as the issues that the Black Lives Matter movement has made evident and 
the inhumane detention of immigrants in the United States (e.g., Mithani et al., 2020; 
Pilkington, 2020), a disciplinary core remains resistant to engaging deeply with questions of 
social oppression or with the narratives of lived experience that members of marginalized 
groups and people deemed abnormal tell (Asch, 2001; Ouellette, 2011; Tremain, 2017; Hall, 
2017). Hope for the future can be glimpsed, nevertheless, in the prospect of shared insight 
between disciplines, including between a disability-conscious bioethics, feminist philosophies 
of disability, and human rights approaches to health and disability (United Nations, 2006; 
Farmer, 2005). Medical education curricula can begin to teach future doctors how to envision 
and carry out structural interventions (Metzl & Hansen, 2014). Inclusion can be an ethical 
project (Allan, 2005) and, likewise, ethics can be inclusive. What remains to be seen is 
whether the tenacious strength of academic, social, and institutional boundaries can be 
overcome and reconfigured enough to include the concerns and voices of the people who 
have been forgotten. 
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1 All current data are taken from The New York Times online feature “Covid in the U.S.: 
Latest Map and Case Count,” which is updated continuously. All numbers cited correspond 
to the data presented on November 1, 2020, with page marked as “Updated November 1, 
2020, 9:22 A.M. E.T.” 
2 Trenton Psychiatric Hospital, Trenton NJ; Bergen New Bridge Medical Center nursing 
home, Paramus NJ; New Lisbon Developmental Center, New Lisbon NJ. 
3 Under the 1999 Olmstead United States Supreme Court decision, it was that the unjustified 
segregation of persons with disabilities constitutes discrimination in violation of title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and that failure to enact timely discharge plans in 
psychiatric hospitals was an example of this type of discrimination. 
4 I wrote a letter to JAMA in response to this article in February of 2015 outlining the history 
of abuse and neglect in asylums, and arguing that there is no reason to believe that a new 
asylum, regardless of how similarly benevolent the current intentions, would evolve 
differently. The letter was not accepted for publication. There was, on the other hand, a letter 
published expressing concerns that: “the reintroduction of the asylum system would worsen 
the plight of persons from ethnic minority backgrounds, based on the discriminatory practices 
of the health care system in the Western world” (Mfoafo-M’Carthy, 2016, p. 68). 
